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If a mint issues two distinct types of silver dollars, one 
containing, say, half as much silver as the other, will both 
coins be used as a medium of exchange? According to the 
popular version of Gresham's law—perhaps the most 
generally accepted and frequently cited proposition in 
economics—the answer is no; only one of the coins will 
circulate because bad money drives out good. In this case 
that means the lighter-weight silver dollar (bad because 
overvalued at the mint) will circulate while the heavier-
weight coin {good because undervalued at the mint) will 
be hoarded. 
Not all proponents of Gresham's law would agree with 
that answer, however. Many would likely say instead that 
to determine what happens to our two silver dollars they 
need more information, for they favor a more careful 
version of the law, one that includes an important 
qualification. Bad money drives out good, according to 
this version, but only when the ratio of the face (or par) 
values of the monies (the par price) is somehow the fixed 
rate at which these monies exchange. When that qualifier 
is true and the par price of the two monies differs from 
their market price, the good money disappears because 
selling it at its intrinsic value is more profitable than using 
it at face value as a medium of exchange. (See, for 
example, Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 27, n. 16.) 
Neither of these versions of Gresham's law is ade-
quate to answer our question about silver dollars or the 
more general question about what happens when the par 
and market prices of two monies differ. The short version 
of the law is simply contradicted by history. There have 
been many periods when bad money has not driven out 
good, periods when undervalued currency has instead 
circulated side by side with overvalued currency. But the 
qualified version of the law is not adequate either. It 
cannot explain the numerous exceptions to the popular 
dictum or predict a general result because it relies on the 
existence of a fixed rate of exchange that is different from 
the market price. We have found no evidence that such a 
fixed rate of exchange ever existed, and that is not 
surprising since it is hard to believe it ever could exist. If 
such a rate ever were managed—through a mint policy or 
a legal tender law, for example—it would imply poten-
tially unbounded profits for currency traders at the 
expense of a very ephemeral mint or a very naive public. 
We propose a more feasible qualification to the 
popular version of Gresham's law, one that depends on 
fixed transaction costs rather than a fixed rate of ex-
change. Bad money will drive good money out of 
circulation, we argue, but only when use of the good 
money at its market (nonpar) price is too expensive. 
Generally, since small change is expensive to use at a 
nonpar price, we expect small denominations of the 
money undervalued at the mint to be scarce while large 
denominations circulate at a premium. History seems to 
support our new version of Gresham's law. 
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17 Gresham's Law—Two Inadequate Versions 
First we describe several historical episodes that contra-
dict the popular, unqualified version of Gresham's law. 
(For a variety of instances in which that version of the law 
appears to work, see Laughlin 1903, pp. 423-28.) We 
then consider in detail the argument that these are not true 
exceptions to Gresham's law because they do not take 
account of the fixed rate of exchange qualification. 
Some Historical Exceptions 
Finding exceptions to the popular version of Gresham's 
law is not difficult. Examining only the nineteenth-
century U.S. experience and one seventeenth-century 
English experience with bimetallism, we discover several 
instances where bad money did not drive out good. What 
makes these exceptions so damaging to the proposition is 
that they occurred during periods for which Gresham's 
law is often cited. 
• 1792-1853—Two U.S. Exceptions 
The period between 1792 and 1853 contains two clear 
exceptions to Gresham's law. One is the U.S. experience 
with the Spanish milled dollar. This was a heavier coin 
than the U.S. silver dollar, containing about 373.5 grains 
of pure silver compared with 371.25 grains in the U.S. 
dollar, and over this period it had legal tender standing. 
However, it was not driven out of circulation. The 
Spanish dollar was popular in the U.S. colonial period 
and remained current at least until the dramatic increase 
in world gold production in the late 1840s. Laughlin 
(1896, p. 54) estimates that there were over 5 million 
Spanish dollars and parts of dollars in 1830,22 percent of 
the value of all coins circulating in the United States. 
From 1792 to 1811, Taxay (1966, p. 125) reports, the 
Spanish dollar circulated at a premium over the U.S. 
dollar, a premium ranging from 0.25 percent to 1 percent. 
It continued to circulate at a premium in later years, 
according to William H. Crawford, secretary of the 
Treasury in 1819 (quoted in Laughlin 1896, p. 53, n. 1): 
"Spanish milled dollars compose the great mass of 
foreign silver coins which circulate in the United States, 
and generally command a premium when compared with 
the dollar of the United States." In this instance, the bad 
money (U.S. silver coins) failed to drive out the good 
(Spanish dollars). Instead of being exported or hoarded, 
this good money circulated at a premium. 
The other exception to Gresham's law during this 
period involves just monies coined by the U.S. mint. 
These were gold and silver coins, whose relative status (as 
good and bad money) in these years changed. This 
change provides a test of Gresham's law that it appears to 
fail. 
For its first 42 years, the U.S. mint overvalued silver. 
On April 2, 1792, Congress passed a coinage act es-
tablishing a national mint and authorizing the issuance of 
gold and silver coins.
1 The act established a ratio of 15 to 1, 
the par price, between silver and gold coins, which was 
the market price in 1792. Soon after the passage of the act, 
however, the market price for gold rose, and it remained 
higher than the par price until June 24, 1834, when the 
second major coinage act raised the par price to 16 to 1. 
Between mid-1792 and mid-1834, therefore, gold was the 
undervalued (good) money and silver was the overvalued 
(bad) money. 
After mid-1834 and until the early 1850s, when 
Congress reduced the silver content of all small-denomi-
nation coins, the status of gold and silver currency was 
reversed. The ratio of 16 to 1 was higher than the market 
price for gold and remained so for the rest of the century. 
Thus gold became the mint's overvalued money and 
silver the undervalued. 
Gresham's law would predict from these facts that the 
only current coinage would be silver before 1834 and gold 
thereafter. But the Gresham's law prediction would be 
wrong. 
Between 1793 and 1846,
2 the U.S. mint coined a 
substantial amount of undervalued bullion. The accom-
panying table presents the dollar values of gold and silver 
coins minted during the two subperiods. When gold was 
undervalued at the mint (1793-1833), 25 percent of the 
coinage was still gold; when silver was undervalued at the 
mint (1834-46), nearly half—45 percent—of the coinage 
was silver. If there was an obvious profit to be made 
coining silver and melting gold coins before 1834 and 
coining gold and melting silver coins thereafter, the 
opportunities do not appear to be reflected in U.S. 
coinage statistics.
3 
iGold coins were issued in the larger denominations,the largest being the 
$ 10 coin, the eagle, and the smallest being a quarter eagle. Silver coins were issued 
in the smaller denominations: the half disme (comparable to our nickel), the disme 
(comparable to our dime), the quarter, the half-dollar, and the dollar. The act also 
allowed individuals to bring unlimited amounts of gold and silver bullion to the mint 
and have it coined without charge; if they demanded immediate exchange, a charge 
of 0.5 percent would be levied. 
2 The dramatic increase in world gold production in the late 1840s led to large 
amounts of gold being coined at the U.S. mint. Since Gresham's law cannot be 
credited with the discoveries that led to the increased gold production, we consider 
the coinage data only through 1846. 
3 Proponents of Gresham's law might argue that even though gold was minted 
it never circulated; it was only exported to countries that valued gold by weight. 
However, estimates of exported coins before 1834 suggest that roughly the same 
dollar amount of silver was exported as gold. Data on gold and silver exports as of 
January 1, 1834, and on annual gold prices and gold and silver coinage are con-
tained in an Appendix that is available from the authors on request. 
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Gresham's Law 
U.S. Coinage of Gold and Silver, 1793-1846 
Percentages of 
Dollar Values Total Minted 
Period Total Gold Silver Gold Silver 
1793-1833 $48,100,975 $1 1,825,892 $36,275,083 25% 75% 
(Gold Undervalued) 
1834-46 $73,331,479 $40,534,060 $32,797,419 55% 45% 
(Silver Undervalued) 
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of the Treasury 1981, pp. 16-17, 25-27 
• Two Later Nineteenth-Century U.S. Exceptions 
Continuing on in U.S. history, we find two more excep-
tions to the simple version of Gresham's law, most 
notably, experiences during the early part of the greenback 
era (1862—79) and the time just after the Bland-Allison 
Act of 1878. 
Greenbacks were legal tender notes issued by Con-
gress to help finance the Civil War. To be consistent with 
Gresham's law, they should have driven both gold and 
silver out of circulation, for greenbacks were the bad 
money of their day. By the act of February 25, 1862, 
Congress was authorized to issue $150 million worth of 
greenbacks. The two subsequent acts of July 11, 1862, 
and March 3,1863, authorized an additional $300 million. 
Because of speculation on the outcome of the war and 
resumption, the gold price of these notes fell from their par 
value when first issued to 91 cents on the dollar 
by June 27, 1862, and to 84 cents by July 22,1862. Six 
months later it had fallen to 68 cents, and by July 22, 
1864, it had fallen below 40 cents. (For a complete list of 
daily price quotes for greenbacks, see Mitchell 1903, 
Appendix A, Table 2.) Over most of the early Civil War 
years, therefore, specie was the undervalued money and 
greenbacks were the overvalued money (in this instance, 
overvalued by the U. S. Treasury, which was accepting all 
legal tender money at par). 
Did greenbacks drive out specie? Some textbooks 
claim they did (Prager 1982, p. 32, for example), but 
Moses, writing in 1892, makes it clear that in the West, 
despite the presence of greenbacks, gold remained the 
unit of account and a medium of exchange. He says that a 
contributor to the San Francisco Daily Herald wrote 
that greenbacks were also current there, but at a discount 
(Moses 1892, p. 18): "A writer in this journal, Feb-
ruary 16,1863, found very little difficulty arising from the 
use of legal tender notes; for they had a market value, and 
most people were ready to receive them at that value." In 
the East it appeared that the money system was reversed. 
There, according to Moses (1892, p. 15), greenbacks 
were accepted as the unit of account and specie circulated 
at a premium. 
The other nineteenth-century U. S. example we present 
that contradicts Gresham's law is the coexistence of the 
trade and Bland dollars in the early 1880s. Both of these 
were U.S. silver dollars, but the lighter-weight Bland 
dollar failed to drive out the heavier-weight trade dollar. 
The trade dollar was authorized by the U.S. coinage 
act of 1873 for a very specific purpose: to increase trade 
with China, a nation that particularly favored silver. The 
act authorized the minting of dollars containing 420 
grams of silver, more than any other silver coin in 
existence, and by 1878 close to 36 million had been 
minted. Because Congress had intended the trade dollar 
only for export, it revoked the trade dollar's legal tender 
status in 1876. Nevertheless, in 1877 many of these 
dollars were circulating in the United States. 
In 1878, under the Bland-Allison Act, Congress 
authorized the minting of another silver dollar, the so-
called Bland dollar. (Congress had suspended the minting 
of all silver dollars except the trade dollar in 1873.) The 
new dollar was to contain less silver than the trade dollar 
(only 412.5 grams), but it was given legal tender status. 
19 The mint was allowed to issue from 2 million to 4 million 
such dollars per month; within two years almost 50 
million had been coined. 
By 1880, therefore, the United States had two silver 
dollars of different weight. If Gresham's law had been 
operative, the trade dollar should have disappeared. In 
fact, both coins circulated (Laughlin 1896, pp. 255-58). 
The Bland dollar was current at par; the trade dollar 
apparently circulated at its gold price, which varied 
around 93 cents. Contrary to Gresham's law, the lighter-
weight Bland dollar not only failed to drive out the 
heavier-weight trade dollar but also managed to circulate 
at a higher price than the heavier-weight dollar. 
• One Irresistible English Exception 
Finding exceptions to Gresham's law in nineteenth-
century U.S. history has not been very hard. Although we 
suspect that many more exceptions could be found in 
other periods as well as in other countries, we did not 
investigate all the possibilities. The examples we have 
described are enough to make our point that bad money 
does not necessarily drive out good money. We did, 
however, come across one other exception that deserves 
mentioning because it is such an obvious contradiction to 
the popular version of Gresham's law. This exception 
occurred in seventeenth-century England, when the En-
glish mint began producing a new gold coin along with the 
silver shilling. The new coin, known as the guinea, quickly 
became the undervalued currency at the mint but circu-
lated at a premium. 
The guinea was first issued in 1663 at the mint price of 
20 shillings, yet it never circulated at that price. The 
significance of a mint price in seventeenth-century En-
gland was similar to what it was to become in nineteenth-
century America. The guinea, although not inscribed with 
any shilling denomination, was legal tender for all 
payments, including taxes, at 20 shillings. In 1663 this 
mint price was well below the guinea's market price; that 
is, the guinea was undervalued at the English mint, and 
the shilling was overvalued. Gresham's law, however, 
apparently did not operate. Consider the account of 
Charles Jenkinson (1805, p. 78), the first earl of Liver-
pool, on the price at which the guinea circulated: 
A Guinea... was ordered in the Mint Indenture to pass for 
20s.; but it immediately became current at a higher rate, by 
general consent, without any authority from Government. 
Mr. Locke, and other writers, who lived during these times, 
asserts, that during the reigns of Charles II. and James II. the 
Guinea passed at from 21s. to 22s.; and Mr. Locke further 
adds... that the Gold Coins varied in their value " according 
to the current rate;" that is, according to the relative value of 
Gold to Silver at the market. The subjects of this country 
paid no attention on this occasion to the rate set upon these 
Coins in the Mint Indenture. 
For many years, the premium was no more than 2 
shillings, but by 1690 the guinea was trading for 30 
shillings, that is, with a 10-shilling premium. Part of the 
reason for the premium was that the public commonly 
clipped the hammered silver coins. This led to the 
recoinage act of 1692, which called in all shillings to be 
reminted and milled (grooved on their edges) so that they 
could not be profitably clipped. The premium on the 
guinea fell from 10 to 1.5 after this recoinage of the 
shilling. The price of 21.5 shillings was then made the new 
mint price, which remained above market rates thereafter.
4 
A Questionable Qualification 
Many advocates of Gresham's law would probably 
object that we have misunderstood their proposition, that 
the law is really more complicated than the simple popular 
version. That is, bad money drives out good only if there is 
a fixed rate of exchange at par. They would argue that we 
have not uncovered any true exceptions to the law be-
cause we ignored this fixed rate of exchange qualification; 
we have instead only uncovered periods when the rate of 
exchange was not fixed. 
In a sense, these advocates would be right. Over these 
periods a fixed rate did not exist, but we do not believe it 
did or would in any period. Claiming that the simple form 
of Gresham's law applies only under a fixed rate of 
exchange is not a complete explanation of what happens 
when the market and par prices of two monies differ. One 
must also explain how the fixed rate prevails when it is not 
the market rate. Two explanations of how this occurs 
have been offered, one based on a mint exchange policy, 
the other on an implication of legal tender laws. Both 
explanations, however, are suspect because there has 
never been either a mint policy or a legal tender law that 
fixed the exchange rate. Moreover, we doubt such a fixed 
rate is even feasible since it leads to potentially unbounded 
losses for the mint or the public. 
If a mint is to fix the exchange rate at par so that 
4Sir Isaac Newton, who was master of the mint in the early part of the eigh-
teenth century, is frequently blamed for England's conversion to a gold standard 
because he had convinced the English authorities to lower the legal price of the 
guinea to 21 shillings. The blame seems misplaced. The legal price of the guinea 
had been above the market price well before Newton took office, and silver had 
been leaving the country at least as early as the turn of the century. Newton esti-
mated that in 1717 the guinea was worth only about 20.8 shillings in the market, 
and he recommended that the legal price be dropped from 21.5 to 21.0 (Breckin-
ridge 1903, p. 45). He effectively saved the English Treasury 0.5 shilling on each 
guinea it received for taxes. Newton may thus properly be blamed for raising taxes, 
but not for the silver exportation that had been going on long before he came to office. 
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Gresham's law applies, the mint must be willing to 
exchange on demand one money for the other at the par 
price. We refer to this as a liberal coinage policy. That 
mints really operated under such a policy, though, is 
doubtful for two reasons. One is that we know of no mints 
that did. Consider, for example, Section 14 of the U.S. 
Coinage Act of 1792 (Laughlin 1896, pp. 300-301): "As 
soon as the said bullion shall have been coined, the person 
or persons by whom the same shall have been delivered, 
shall, upon demand, receive in lieu thereof coins of the 
same species of bullion which shall have been so 
delivered, weight for weight, of the pure gold or pure silver 
therein contained" (emphasis added). Thus at least while 
this act was binding, the U.S. mint did not exchange gold 
for silver on demand at the price of 1 ounce of gold for 15 
ounces of silver. Individuals bringing silver bullion to the 
mint could expect only silver coins in return; likewise, 
those bringing gold bullion could get only gold coins. 
Furthermore, we have been unable to find records of any 
mint that even tried to operate under a liberal coinage 
policy. Of course, a few such mints may have existed, but 
even if they did, that would not be enough to justify the 
innumerable references to Gresham's law. 
The second reason to doubt that mints operated under 
a liberal coinage policy is that we can easily construct 
models in which such a policy is not feasible. (An 
example is given in the Appendix of this paper, which is 
available on request.) These models demonstrate what 
seems quite obvious. If there is a large enough outstanding 
stock of both commodity monies available when the mint 
offers a bargain price for one of the monies, then the mint 
will quickly run out of resources. In such a situation, 
assuming the mint has limited resources, the liberal 
coinage policy will quickly be revoked or the mint will 
quickly go out of business. 
Some advocates of the qualified version of Gresham's 
law recognize that mints did not fix the exchange rate of 
two monies at par. They claim, however, that legal tender 
laws did. In this claim, too, currency traders are sup-
posedly offered the possibility of large profits, but now it 
is by trading with a general public who are accepting all 
currency at the par price rather than the market price. 
Laughlin (1903, p. 431) describes the view that profits 
can be obtained in this way: "Supposing the kinds of 
money in question to have a ratio to each other in the 
market different than they have in the legal ratio, then it 
will be seen at once that the cheaper will not drive out the 
dearer unless they are equally a legal tender for common 
uses. The opportunity to earn the profit obtained by 
changing one for the other depends on their being equally 
acceptable at some places of receipts." 
This legal tender explanation for Gresham's law is just 
as suspicious as the explanation based on a liberal 
coinage policy. Like mint policies, legal tender laws did 
not fix the exchange rate of two monies at their face value. 
Legal tender laws say that the public must accept in 
payment for all transactions (debts, taxes, and purchases 
of goods and services) particular monies at their legal 
(par) price. No provision in such laws, though, prevents 
the public from implicitly quoting prices in the legally 
overvalued money. If prices are quoted in the bad money, 
merchants and creditors would be more than willing to 
accept the good money at par. They would be willing, in 
fact, to pay a premium to those consumers and debtors 
who used the good money. These informal arrangements 
would not be in violation of the legal tender laws, and they 
would leave little, if any, profitable opportunities for 
currency traders. Thus legal tender laws provide no 
reason for good money to disappear from circulation. 
That they provide no rationale for Gresham's law is 
also not surprising. If legal tender laws somehow fixed the 
price at which the public minted and exchanged monies, 
currency traders could earn potentially unbounded profits 
at the expense of a very simple-minded public. As long as 
the public naively minted good money to use at par, 
currency traders' opportunities would be unlimited. 
Gresham's Law Revised—Denomination 
Determines Good Money's Fate 
We have cited historical examples to show that there are 
numerous exceptions to the popular claim that bad money 
drives out good. We have also argued that the explana-
tions offered for these exceptions are not convincing. 
Nevertheless, we do not mean to imply, as others have 
suggested, that bad money never drives out good. We do 
mean to point out, though, that when it does and how it 
does still require explanation.
5 What can confidently be 
expected to happen when two monies exist and their 
market and par prices differ? We offer a version of 
Gresham's law that relies on fixed transaction costs rather 
than a fixed exchange rate and that predicts what happens 
much better than current explanations. 
A New Qualification 
In arguing against the coinage act of 1853 to reduce the 
weight of U.S. small-denomination silver coins, Andrew 
5 In an attempt to salvage the fixed exchange rate version of Gresham's law in 
their model of commodity money, Sargent and Wallace (1983, pp. 178-81) 
impose quite restrictive legal restrictions. In their model, by allowing the public to 
use only paper receipts (for gold and silver) instead of coins as a medium of ex-
change, the government can influence which commodity is used in exchange and 
which is used in production. However, such legal restrictions have seldom been 
imposed; they probably never have been before the twentieth century. 
21 Johnson (quoted in Laughlin 1896, p. 85 and its n. 2) 
anticipated a Modigliani-Miller kind of irrelevance theo-
rem: 
Congress can not regulate the value of the coin If we can, 
then... I ask the House and the country if the philosopher's 
stone has not been discovered? . . . The commercial world 
will take the coins for what they are intrinsically worth, and 
not for what the legal stamp represents them to be worth. 
... So far as coin is concerned, the changing of our 
standard of gold and silver has no more effect upon the gold 
and silver coinage of the United States than a change in the 
standard of weights and measures would have upon the price 
of our cotton or wheat. 
Johnson's version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem is 
that mint prices are irrelevant to what becomes the rate at 
which two currencies exchange; the market can easily 
price coins by their weight instead of by their face value. 
Johnson's argument evidently did not convince many 
in Congress because the act was passed and the silver 
content of small-denomination coins was reduced. Pre-
sumably to Johnson's surprise, the intent of the law was 
realized. The new lighter-weight coins had no trouble 
circulating at their par value. While the older, heavier-
weight coins disappeared from circulation, the newer 
coins were quite visible. 
Hence, just as the unqualified version of Gresham's 
law ascribes too much power to government decrees, 
Johnson's irrelevance claim ascribes too little. A crucial 
question thus seems to be, Why does undervalued money 
circulate side by side with overvalued money in some 
economies but not in others? Our answer depends partly 
on the existence of a legal tender law, but mostly on the 
costs of using a currency at a nonpar price. 
A legal tender law plays a role in answering our 
question because it determines which money serves as the 
unit of account, that is, which money is used at par prices. 
The reasoning is the same as that which we used earlier to 
explain why this law does not require currency to 
exchange at par. According to a frictionless general 
equilibrium theory, what serves as the unit of account, or 
numeraire, is indeterminate; one good serves this function 
as well as another. If both the undervalued and the 
overvalued currency must be accepted for all payments at 
their par values, however, agents will set their price in the 
overvalued currency and be more than willing to accept 
the undervalued at par. A legal tender law can thus be 
viewed as placing transaction costs on undervalued 
money when it is used as the unit of account, thereby 
breaking the indeterminacy implied by general equilib-
rium theory in favor of the overvalued money. 
Even though the existence of a legal tender law might 
explain which money becomes the unit of account, it does 
not predict when undervalued money circulates at a 
premium and when it does not. We argue that whether or 
not a currency circulates at a premium depends on the 
costs incurred in paying such premiums. Clearly, if the 
costs are zero, Johnson would have been right. The 
transaction costs of paying a premium may easily not be 
zero, though, especially for small-denomination currency. 
And when costs are nonnegligible, the public will usually 
be better off bundling small-denomination currency, that 
is, accumulating and using large quantities of it. As a 
result, small-denomination coins will more or less disap-
pear from circulation. 
This tendency for small-denomination currency to 
disappear stems from the fact that paying premiums on 
small-denomination currency tends to be more costly 
than paying them on large-denomination currency. That 
is, there are economies of scale in using currency at non-
par prices. It is unlikely that currency systems will have a 
continuum of denominations: there have rarely been 
fractional coins smaller than a penny. This means that 
paying the fractional part of any premium usually in-
volves some rounding. And that becomes especially 
costly on small denominations. Consider a silver dollar, 
for example, that is worth 104.2 cents in gold. The silver 
dime is then worth 10.42 cents and the silver nickel 5.21 
cents. Rounded up, the premium on the silver dollar 
would be 5 cents. The premium on a dollar's worth of 
dimes or nickels (used in individual transactions), though, 
would be even more: as much as 10 cents (1 cent on each 
dime) or 20 cents (1 cent on each nickel). Generally, the 
smaller the denomination, the more costly it is to pay the 
fractional part of a premium. 
Because of this additional cost, traders are not likely to 
pay premiums on individual small-denomination coins. 
Thus the public is not likely to use these coins as a 
medium of exchange and is, rather, likely to collect them 
into large quantities that will exchange at a full premium; 
that is, individual units of small-denomination currency 
will tend to be bundled and taken out of circulation. 
Confronting History 
To test our version of Gresham's law, we return to three of 
the nineteenth-century U.S. periods we examined earlier, 
all of which had some type of legal tender law. In these 
periods, currency overvalued at the mint tended to be the 
unit of account. Undervalued large-denomination cur-
rency circulated at a premium while undervalued small-
denomination coins disappeared. 
During the silver standard period (1792-1833), of the 
undervalued currency, only the large denominations 
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seem to have circulated. At that time, undervalued large-
denomination currency consisted of gold coins and 
Spanish dollars that contained more silver than the U.S. 
dollar. While most of the gold was exported, the Spanish 
dollar circulated for many years at a premium (Taxay 
1966, p. 231; Laughlin 1896, p. 53, n. 1). The small 
change available during this period consisted of U.S. 
silver coins and a substantial amount of Spanish coins. 
The small-denomination Spanish coins contained less 
silver than the U. S. coins (just the opposite relationship to 
that between the Spanish and U.S. dollars), and, as our 
hypothesis predicts, the undervalued small U.S. coins 
had trouble circulating. Robert Patterson, director of the 
U.S. mint, provides evidence of this in his April 2,1807, 
letter to President Jefferson (quoted in Taxay 1966, p. 
126): 
Small Spanish Silver coins are extremely plenty,... and as 
their nominal and circulating value is considerably above 
their real intrinsic value, they will neither be sent to the Mint, 
used in Manufactures, nor carried out of the country, but 
indeed are daily increasing by importation. Small Coins of 
the U. States will therefore be less necessary for the sake of 
change, while foreign small silver continues to be a circulat-
ing medium. We lately struck at the Mint nearly a quarter of 
a million of Silver dismes: it is however with the utmost 
difficulty, that we can prevail upon any of the Banks to 
accept of them, and in fact nearly half the number still remain 
in our vaults. [Emphasis added] 
Patterson's letter suggests that at least small transactions 
were implicitly stated in Spanish prices; that is, small 
Spanish silver coins circulated at their nominal value. For 
U.S. silver coins to circulate, therefore, they would have 
had to exchange at a premium, and that probably was not 
worth the effort for most people. That the mint had 
difficulty getting banks to use this money, therefore, is 
consistent with our version of Gresham's law. 
Our other two periods also generally support our 
prediction for undervalued large- and small-denomina-
tion currency. In both periods the undervalued small-
denomination currency tended to disappear from circula-
tion. After silver became the undervalued currency in 
1834, the United States developed a small-change short-
age that led to an 185 3 act authorizing the mint to produce 
lighter-weight silver coins. The problem recurred when 
greenbacks were introduced in 1862. These notes de-
preciated so much that small-denomination silver coins 
again became undervalued, and again they disappeared. 
Yet in at least one of these periods, some undervalued 
large-denomination currency managed to circulate, and 
not at face value. The undervalued silver dollars did not 
circulate much in either period. According to Laughlin 
(1896, p. 82), they completely disappeared well before 
the 1853 act. However, as noted earlier, in the East 
during the greenback era, while the overvalued green-
backs exchanged at par, an undervalued money, gold, 




Standard economic theory predicts that in equilibrium 
only one price for a good can prevail. Thus when the par 
price of two monies is not the same as the market rate of 
exchange, either one of the monies does not circulate at 
par or one does not circulate at all. The popular claim is 
that, when the par price is out of line with the market price, 
the money overvalued at the mint drives out the under-
valued money. This claim has become generally accepted 
and is known as Gresham's law. 
We have argued that the popular version of this 
proposition does not deserve its status as a law because it 
has too many unexplained exceptions. An examination of 
only a small part of U.S. and English coinage history 
reveals episodes that do not conform to the claim's 
prediction. In many instances, both bad and good money 
appear to have been current. 
Moreover, the qualified version of the law is unsatis-
factory. Its explanation for the apparent exceptions to the 
simple version, based on the lack of a fixed rate of 
exchange, is suspect because it is doubtful that such a rate 
ever existed or ever could have existed. There is no 
evidence that any mints ever fixed the exchange rate at 
par, and it is unlikely that mints would ever try. Nor did 
legal tender laws fix exchange rates, and we doubt they 
ever could. 
We have gone on to present a new version of 
Gresham's law that seems more reasonable and works 
much better than current versions: Bad money drives 
good money out of circulation only when the costs of 
using the good money at a premium are significant. 
6Some of the Bland dollar experience does not seem consistent with our ex-
planation. The Bland dollar was the overvalued money in the 1880s, and it circu-
lated at par as we predict. The undervalued gold currency also circulated in this 
period. However, it did so at par, not at a premium. (See Laughlin 1896, pp. 255-5 8, 
for one explanation of why this occurred.) 
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